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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Promise of Arbitration
Arbitration has long served as a contractual substitute for judicial litigation. 1 It
provided a workable and effective form of adjudication in ancient societies and
among religious groups, much as it does in contemporary times. 2 Its long-standing
appeal resides in enabling parties to choose a private adjudicatory mechanism based
upon expertise and expedition that delivers fair, affordable, and enforceable
outcomes. Arbitral adjudication effectively intermediates between the need for
functional trial procedures and the imperative of safeguarding legal rights.3 Rights
†

Professor Carbonneau is the Orlando Distinguished Professor and Director, Arbitration
Institute Penn State Law.
1
For a general account of the history of arbitration, see, e.g., FRANCES KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); IAN R.
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); Lord
Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43 (1989); Katherine V.W.
Stone, Arbitration-National, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY (D. Clark ed.
forthcoming); Imre S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM. J.
LEGAL HISTORY 355 (2009).
2

See sources cited supra note 1.

3

According to the late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, “ADR devices are often superior
to litigation ‘in terms of cost, time, and human wear and tear.’” AMF Inc., v. Brunswick
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief
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cannot be vindicated if the applicable hearing mechanisms are inaccessible and
inefficient. The protracted puffery of lawyers is not a feasible solution for most
parties in conflict.
Although it casts them—to some degree—in a misleading and unflattering light,
arbitral procedures gained sharper definition when they were adopted by trade
groups just prior to and following the industrial revolution. 4 The objective was to
shield business operations from legal encroachments. Legal requirements could
hinder significantly the efficacy of commercial relationships and the profitability of
transactions.5 Adjudicators, experienced in the trade and prone to practical solutions,
could perform their decisional tasks in informal trial settings. In a word, decisionmakers of a kindred spirit avoided ritualistic fanfare and rendered rulings that
properly reflected the interests of their colleagues. The flexible confines of
arbitration permitted parties to be heard and a record of the matter constituted
without subjecting the litigants and their disagreement to adversarial
dismemberment. In these commercial sectors, rationality and pragmatism generally
prevailed in the resolution of disputes. 6
Justice of the United States, at the Twin Cities Advisory Council of the American Arbitration
Association, St. Paul, Minn., August 21, 1985). Arbitration permits “merchants and
companies to expend more resources on their commercial activities by supplying them with a
frugal, fair, and final form of expert and effective adjudication.” Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343,
1367 (2009) [hereinafter Judicial Approbation]. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 21 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE]
(Proponents “seek to achieve two basic goals: First, the practical objective of lessening the
human and economic costs associated with judicial litigation; second, the ideological and
humanistic aim of ‘empowering’ disputants and to have them develop a psychologically
‘healthier’ approach to conflict management.”).
4

“The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in groceries and
other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major trading centers.”
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 n.2 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also 50 A.B.A. Rep. 357 (1925).
5

See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999), (citing SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 92-96 (3d ed. 2d prtg. 1966)); Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in
Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258
(1933); JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 53-55 (1918).
6
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in
the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007) [hereinafter Arbitracide] (“An
adjudicatory process that is efficient, effective, and accessible can hardly be described as
incapable of protecting rights. The expense and indecision associated with protracted
adversarial proceedings before courts do not protect citizen rights, but rather promote the
attorneys' combat and embellish their fees. Lawyers, of course, tendentiously assert that
participation in their battleground is synonymous with rights protection. The argument
ignores the impact of litigation warfare on the litigants' lives and interests.”); Litigation Cost
Survey of Major Companies: Presentation to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
Judicial Conference of the United States, 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, DUKE LAW
SCHOOL 2 (May 10-11, 2010) (statement of U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform),
http://lfcj.digidoq.com/BLAP/Lawyers%20for%20Civil%20Justice/FRCP%20DATA%20Liti
gation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies%202010.pdf
(Finding
that
“[l]itigation transaction costs [for large corporations for cases which go to trial] on average
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In fact, efficient results—comprehensible to the parties and providing useful
solutions—represented a more acceptable form of fairness than the legal system’s
narrow, single-minded focus upon procedural rigor and its jesuitical construction of
applicable law. Legal procedures are alien to ordinary human experience.
Moreover, judicial litigation is permeated with distrust and cynicism. These
attitudes blind advocates to sensible compromise, causing them to undervalue and
reject human ingenuity, resourcefulness, and creativity in the circumstances of
disagreement.7 Coerced settlements or protracted proceedings are the inevitable
outcomes.8 Trade association arbitration was not merely “merchant justice,” but
and as a percent of revenue have risen substantially over the past nine years . . . [excluding
judgments and settlements]. . . . The average outside litigation cost per respondent was nearly
$115 million in 2008, up 73 percent from $66 million in 2000. This represents an average
increase of 9 percent each year.”).
7
See David Gwynn Morgan, Fairness ‘Too Much of a Good Thing’, THE POST-IRELAND
(Nov. 21 2010), available at http://www.sbpost.ie/businessoflaw/fairness-too-much-of-a-good
-thing-52870.html (“[T]he law is dealing with institutions of government in a constitutional
democracy and assumes one of the features distinguishing [judges] from private individuals is
that they are non-partisan and open to persuasion, as long as all the relevant facts are put
before them.”); Advantages and Disadvantages of the Adversarial System in Civil
Proceedings, LRCWA 7, 41 n.21 (1998), http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/
reports/P92-CJS/consults/1-2civiladvers.pdf (The obsessive focus on procedural correctness in
litigation “inhibit[s] the courts’ capacity to link other organizations that might help the users
of courts with other aspects of their problems. Courts are compared unfavorably with
[arbitral] tribunals on this subject,” and need to be “more procedurally and substantially just,
expeditious, proportionate, managed and maximizing of resources.”); John A. Ferejohn &
Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974-75 (2002) (“Many commentators see these concerns for
judicial accountability as inescapably in conflict with the goals of judicial independence: The
only way to make judges accountable for their decisions is to control them in ways that
intrude on their independence. But this mischaracterizes the problem, and we think that
framing the issue differently dissolves any apparent contradiction. Neither judicial
independence nor judicial accountability are ends in and of themselves. Both are means
toward the construction of a satisfactory process for adjudication. As we have seen, this
means a process that is appropriately ‘legal’ in its nature: one in which decisions are made for
appropriately legal sorts of reasons, without regard for considerations that law considers
extraneous or immaterial. As we have also seen, however, it means a process that is subject to
legitimate democratic control over differences in the range of outcomes procurable within the
confines of legal analysis: a process in which judges cannot deviate too far from popular
political understandings for reasons unconstrained but not excluded by law. Not surprisingly,
these joint and several allegiances to law and democracy―with their joint and several
objectives
of
procedural
rectitude,
legal
impartiality,
and
democratic
accountability―necessitate a complex institutional design. Searching for the right system, we
mix and match in different ways and to different degrees various arrangements―some
protecting the independence of judges, others making them accountable―in the effort to
construct a properly balanced judiciary.”).
8
Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 269 n.160 (“Access and operational effectiveness are the
attributes of the arbitral process that make it far superior to judicial litigation. It achieves
functionality while also protecting rights and assuring that arbitral proceedings guarantee due
process rights.”); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU ON ARBITRATION: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 360, n.32 (2010) [hereinafter ON ARBITRATION] (Among specialized groups,
arbitration stands for “adjudicatory efficiency, privacy, flexibility, and expertise”); (“[T]he
human civilization associated with law and the legal process.”); (describing the Supreme
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adjudication that satisfied the real needs of its users. It gave effect to a rule of law9
anchored in the commercial habits and personality of the community of merchants. 10
Arbitration rekindled the value of finality in adjudication. 11 It gave res judicata
its proper significance in the process of litigation. The conclusive resolution of
disputes was indispensable to social civilization. A social dynamic in which
disappointment was cultivated and failed circumstances were perpetually
reconsidered would undermine the operation of society. In arbitration, the litigants’
time, energy, and treasure—not to mention their rights—no longer needed to be
sacrificed to a distant, insatiable, and abstract “ideal” of justice. Parties could
engage in an effective and workable process of adjudication. They could explain
their behavior, state their positions on the issues, be given a determination, and
resume their business activities. In arbitration, advocacy was reunited with a
measured sense of purpose and an awareness that adversarialism could have a
destructive impact upon the parties, their interests, and society. The utility and
resourcefulness of the arbitral remedy eventually led it to have a broader role in
American society.12

Court’s rulings on arbitration as “motivated exclusively by a desire to fulfill its responsibility
to the rule of law―to the provision of effective legal and juridical services in American
society.”); and (“the rule of law is also instrumental to an individual’s rights and personal
allegiance to society.”). Id. at 43-44.
9

See ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 4 (“Practicability has emerged as the dominant
force in the definition and implementation of law”); (“The general recourse to arbitration
reflects a growing need for more rational dispute resolution”); (The use of arbitration . . .
“evidences confidence in human rationality, the capacity to achieve compromise, and, more
generally, a stance for more far-reaching dispute resolution goals. . . . Arbitration allows the
parties to assume responsibility for and exercise basic governance over their adjudicatory
destiny.”).
10

See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]
(providing that “an award can be denied recognition or enforcement if it is not final or has
been set aside by a court in another jurisdiction with contacts to the arbitration”). See also
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 794
(5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]. ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 191 (“[T]he view
that arbitration is an autonomous and fully-functional adjudicatory process and that the
contract of arbitration is the law between the parties . . . allows for the possibility that the
earlier arbitral award constitutes a final and binding determination of the question, precluding
the court from ruling . . . on the basis of res judicata.”).
11

ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 156 (The doctrine of functus officio emphasizes the
“importance of finality in arbitration and the need to contain the appeal of awards to
fundamental procedural irregularities,” fostering efficiency, justice, and finality); CASEBOOK,
supra note 10, at 701 (“The doctrine is motivated by the perception that arbitrators, lacking
the institutional protection of judges, may be more susceptible to outside influences pressuring
for a different outcome and also by the practical concern that the ad hoc nature of arbitral
tribunals makes them less amenable to re-convening than a court.”).
12

See Judicial Approbation, supra note 3, at 1343.
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B. The Work of the Court
The U.S. Supreme Court has been the chief advocate for arbitration’s integration
into the adjudicatory mainstream.13 Judicial support has been vital to arbitration
wherever it has taken hold.14 In the last forty years, the High Court has decided
forty-five arbitration cases and continues to cast a watchful eye upon the evolution of
13

The U.S. Supreme Court sees the Federal Arbitration Act as a vehicle for achieving the
congressional objective of fostering the enforcement of arbitration agreements. See generally
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1
(1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Court federalized the law of arbitration through the federal
preemption doctrine, immunizing arbitration from conflicting state law regulatory provisions.
See Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland, 465 U.S. 1; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.,
460 U.S. 1 (The Court discovered a strong “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in
the Act. Id. at 24.); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986); Southland,
465 U.S. 1. The U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized the role of contractual freedom in
arbitration, requiring courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate in
accordance with parties’ stipulations. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989). The Court also substantially increased the decisional sovereignty of the arbitrator
to decide the arbitration agreement’s meaning, confining courts to the most basic threshold
matters. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
The Court advanced a wide definition of interstate commerce, extending the scope of the
FAA’s application to almost all commercial transactions. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
539 U.S. 52 (2003). It also increased the scope of arbitrability to encompass the vast majority
of statutory claims. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
14
See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Ins., 450 U.S. 728
(1981); Wright v. Universal Mar. Ser. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1981); Moses H. Cone Mem’l, 460
U.S. 1, 24; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1; Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. 79; Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614; AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52; Allied-Bruce
Terminix, 513 U.S. 265; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528
(1995); Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681; Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529
U.S. 193 (2000); Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531
U.S. 57 (2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504 (2001); Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444; Citizens Bank, 539 U.S.
52; PacifiCare Health, 538 U.S. 401; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 529 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct.
978 (2008); Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008);14 Penn Plaza,
129 S. Ct. 1456; Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758; EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bro. of Teamsters, 561 U.S., 130 J. Ct. 2847 (2011).
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arbitration law among lower courts. As it built its decisional “edifice” 15 on
arbitration, the Court refashioned the content of the U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),16 seeking to make arbitration impervious both to serious attacks and
perfunctory, but time-consuming adversarial challenges.17 As a result, the statute is
now animated by a strong or emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration. 18
Moreover, the federal law overrides any state law of arbitration that conflicts with its
basic precepts, giving the FAA (as construed by the Court and informed by the
principles of CBA arbitration) absolute dominion over the national regulation of
arbitration.19 Freedom of contract and party intent—otherwise stated, the agreement
15

CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 229 (quoting Allied-Bruce
Terminix, 513 U.S. 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal
Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation . . .”)).
16

See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1925) [hereinafter FAA]. Title 9, §§ 114, first enacted on February 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669),
amended September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter Two was added on July 31, 1970 (84
Stat. 692). Two sections were added to Chapter One by Congress in October 1988, and
renumbered on December 1, 1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 669 and 702); Chapter Three was added on
August 15, 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-369); and Section 10 was amended on November 15, 1990.
See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 57-94.
17
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi
Motors, 473 U.S. at 625.
18

The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to contain a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration. See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 10 at 57-92. See also Prima Paint,
388 U.S. at 411 (The FAA is “a congressional directive” to federal courts on how they should
rule on matters of arbitration regardless of the holding in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)). Federal courts ruling on the basis of diversity of citizenship must apply the
provisions of the FAA on matters of arbitration. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 34-35; AlliedBruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265. The Supreme Court applies a wide view of interstate
commerce. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56. In applying the federal policy favoring arbitration,
federal courts generally uphold unilateral adhesive arbitration contracts. Shearson/Am.
Express, 482 U.S. 220. But see Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 314 (an agreement to arbitrate in
the employment context does not bar a plaintiff from obtaining relief through the EEOC. The
majority noted, however, that permitting such accesses “will have a negligible effect on the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”). The statute does not incorporate the kompetenzkompetenz doctrine, but the U.S. Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago provided for the
doctrine by contract; parties could agree to submit jurisdictional challenges—by contract—to
the arbitrators. First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 946. More recently, the Court
emphasized the arbitrators’ power to decide threshold matters of procedural arbitrability. See
Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; PacifiCare Health, 538 U.S. at 406-07; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444. See also
Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. 529 (holding that “a litigant who was not a party to the relevant
arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce
the agreement). The Court provided for wide venue in the enforcement of arbitral awards.
Cortez Byrd Chips, 529 U.S. 193.
19
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (“Federal law in the terms of the
Arbitration Act governs . . . in either state or federal court.”); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16
(“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221 (“The preeminent concern of Congress
in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is
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as written—prevail unless they are themselves antagonistic to the recourse to
arbitration.20 Arbitrations and arbitrators have considerable autonomy. With
contract permission or the choice of certain institutional rules,21 arbitrators can
resolve challenges to their jurisdiction. 22 Additionally, when the contract fails to
provide for arbitrator authority to rule on jurisdiction, arbitrators can—as a matter of
law—interpret the arbitral clause in the same sovereign manner they construe the
underlying contract. Recent litigation, however, may have placed restrictions on the
arbitrators’ threshold powers. It appears that, despite the invention of a second
arbitrability doctrine, courts will review the contract sufficiency of a jurisdictional
delegation if the question is properly stated to the supervising court. 23
According to the Court, because arbitration is but a means of conducting a trial—
exclusively a matter of procedure—its application has no impact upon substantive
“piecemeal” litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal
statute. . . . By compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects
the contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act.”); Volt Info.
Scis., 489 U.S. at 472 (“While the FAA therefore pre-empts application of state laws which
render arbitration agreements unenforceable, ‘[i]t does not follow, however, that the federal
law has preclusive effect in a case where the parties have chosen in their [arbitration]
agreement to abide by state rules.’”); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he Act has
the basic purpose of overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and applies in both
federal diversity cases and state courts, where it pre-empts state statutes invalidating such
agreements.”); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281:
“What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms .
. . but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy
unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’
directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress's intent.”); Buckeye Check Cashing, 546
U.S. at 449 (“[R]egardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a
challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration
clause, must go to the arbitrator.”); Preston, 552 U.S. at 350 (“[W]hen parties agree to
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in
another forum, whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the FAA.”).
20
Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479 (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
. . . By permitting the courts to "rigorously enforce" such agreements according to their
terms[,] . . . we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without
doing violence to the policies behind by the FAA.”); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (“[T]he
FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting
parties.”).
21

See First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938; ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures,
JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last visited July 10, 2010); AAA's Rules and
Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited
July 10, 2010) (providing rules for commercial, consumer, employment, labor, and
government arbitrations).
22

See Howsam, 537 U.S. 79; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444. But see Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct.

1758.
23
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686; Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 449 (“[R]egardless
of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”).
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas,
490 U.S. at 486.
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rights.24 Also, arbitrations proffer the same procedural protections and remedies as a
court of law.25 Such statements, at best, are suspect and perhaps fanciful. They are
nonetheless an integral part of the Court’s decisional doctrine on arbitration. Both
contract and statutory disputes can be submitted to arbitration. 26 In fact, a broad
submission includes both types of disputes as a matter of law. 27 Additionally, civil
rights claims—despite their significance to American political and constitutional
history—can be submitted to arbitration without qualification or preconditions.
Unless arbitrators fail to disclose possible conflicts of interest, 28 the nullification of
24
Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 232 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473
U.S. at 628 (Ordinarily, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.”)); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (“[R]esort to the
arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to
petitioners.”).
25
See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614. See also Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. 220;
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
26
See MedCam Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972 (8th Cir. 2005); Orange Cty. Choppers, Inc.
v. Goen Techn. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., 382 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2004).
27
14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1474 (holding that a “collective-bargaining agreement that
clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [civil rights] claims is
enforceable as a matter of federal law . . .”).
28

See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 12(a) [hereinafter RUAA] (“Before accepting
appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a
reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding,
including: (1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and
(2) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the
arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrators
[sic].”). RUAA section 12(f) provides: “If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the
procedures of an arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators
before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition
precedent to a [motion] to vacate an award on that ground under Section 23(a)(2).” RUAA §
12(f).
See FAA, supra note 16, § 10. Section 10 provides that the United States District Court,
in and for the district wherein the award was made, may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration “where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or undue means [or] where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators.” Id. While recognizing that arbitrators are not expected to sever their ties with the
business community, the Court concluded that it must be scrupulous in safeguarding the
impartiality of arbitrators, because they have “completely free reign to decide the law as well
as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.” Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). To achieve this goal, the Court imposed
“the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create
an impression of possible bias.” See id. Although the Court noted that there was no evidence
of actual bias in the case before it, the arbitrator's failure to disclose his business relationship
with the prime contractor “constituted evident partiality justifying vacation of the award.” See
id. Congress intended the “evident partiality” clause of § 10(a)(2) to ensure a fair and
impartial arbitral process. See id. Section 2 provides that “an arbitrator may be challenged
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arbitral awards is, at best, a remote possibility.29 In the Court’s view, private
arbitrations are sui generis, or “one-off” events, with little, if any, consequence
beyond the arbitrating parties and their transaction. 30 This assertion, once again,
induces skepticism and, in fact, disbelief; its “truth,” however, resides in its
facilitation of a supportive and deferential judicial doctrine on arbitration.
Articulating the latter has been an imperative for the High Court. Accordingly,
judicial correction or emendation—as commanded by the governing statute—is
limited to egregious, aberrant denials of procedural justice. 31 The bargain for
arbitration must be given effect even when adhesion makes the agreement legally
questionable.32 Although the FAA contains a restriction on the arbitrability of
only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubt as to his impartiality or
independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties.” UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 12, 2, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302.
The General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure provide that
“[e]very arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of accepting an
appointment to serve and shall remain so during the entire arbitration proceedings until the
final award has been rendered or the proceeding has otherwise finally terminated.” Part I
Rule (1), IBA Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, IBANET.ORG (May 22, 2004),
http://www.ibanet.org/ENews_Archive/IBA_July_2008_ENews_ArbitrationMultipleLang.asp
x. The AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators establishes a presumption that all
arbitrators, including party-designated arbitrators, are neutral. The Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (2004), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/commercial_ disputes.authcheckdam.pdf;
Ethics
Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, CALIFORNIA COURTS (adopted
by the Judicial Council of California April 19, 2002), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
ethics_standards_neutral_arbitrators.pdf; DEERING’S CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, Appendix,
Division VI (Lexis-Nexus 2003); Harry L. Arkin, Neutrality of Dispute Resolution in
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 15(11) WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 270 (2004);
Markham Ball, Probity Deconstructed – How Helpful, Really, are the New International Bar
Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration?, 15(9) WORLD
ARB. & MED. REP. 333 (2004).
29

See generally Matthew David Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral
Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (1993); Laurence Shore,
Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility vis-a-vis Legal Standards, 57
DISP. RESOL. J. 32 (2002); James Wangelin, Buttressing the Pillars of Arbitration, 19(1) INT’L
ARB. REP. 27 (2004); Otto de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser, & Neomi Rao, Background
Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 5 BUS.
L. INT’L 433 (2004). See also CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 540.
30

See Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. 220.

31

ON ARBITRATION supra note 8, at 142 (The strong presumption in FAA § 10 favoring
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards limits judicial oversight. Awards that are subject to
vacatur must arise from an “arbitration [that was] corrupted or denatured as an adjudicatory
proceeding [and] it amounts to a denial of justice to one of the parties.” Such “debilitating
elements” include: bias in the arbitrators, unrevealed relationships among parties to the
arbitration, bribery, and arbitrator interest in the outcome. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999) (“parties agree to arbitrate and trade ‘the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.’”).
32

See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
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employment disputes,33 the near totality of workplace controversies can be heard and
decided by arbitrators.34
The Court’s decisional law on arbitration is steadfast (at least, in terms of
assembling a majority of Justices for each case), 35 despite the variable political
strains in the Court’s composition, the ubiquitous turnover of its membership, and
the succession of Chief Justices.36 Over the years, the haphazard thinking and
periodic brevity37 of some rulings demonstrated that the Justices were not necessarily
interested in the doctrinal content of arbitration law, but rather perceived arbitration
primarily as a means of achieving an important practical objective. 38 Despite
vigorous discussions in a few cases, the Court has not seen arbitration as a law that
warrants rigorous analysis.39 It is an adjudicatory procedure that allows the legal
process to manage its resources and dockets when the other branches of government
33

See FAA, supra note 16, § 4 (the so-called employment contract exclusion); Circuit
City Stores, 532 U.S. at 112 (the employment contract exclusion is limited to transportation
workers “‘actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.’”).
34
See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51
(1957) (“. . . § 301(a) is more than jurisdictional . . . it authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and
includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under
collective bargaining agreements.”).
35

The three most recent decisions were essentially decided by a 5-to-4 margin and divided
the Court on grounds of political ideology. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (5-to-3
with one justice abstaining from the decision); Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772; AT&T
Mobility, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
36
The last three Supreme Court Chief Justices favored arbitration. See generally AT&T
Mobility (Roberts, J., joining); Bazzle, 531 U.S. 79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also
Broadcast: Chief Justice Burger urges use of arbitration to settle legal disputes (NBC News
1982), http://www.nbcuniversalarchives.com/nbcuni/clip5112516837 _s12.do.
37
The decisional law on arbitration is not a domain for sophisticated judicial analysis. In
fact, many decisions appear to contain seat-of-pants inventions that “fix” the problem that
arose in the case. The rulings are not persuasive statements of doctrine. Arbitration, for the
Court, is a device for implementing policy. It is a lawyer’s area (because it is a trial
mechanism), but it fails to capture the Court’s intellectual interest. See, e.g., First Options of
Chicago, 514 U.S. 938 (the jurisdictional delegation strengthens arbitral autonomy, but it also
conflicts with FAA § 3); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (arbitration is a “mere form of
trial” having no impact on substantive statutory rights—a contention that hardly makes sense
given the procedural traditions of the American legal system); Shearson/Am. Exp., 482 U.S.
220 (The Court forgets its express qualification of the holding in Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S.
416, confining it to transborder arbitration and proclaims ex cathedra the universal
arbitrability of statutory rights).
38

The purpose of judicial supervision in the arbitral context seems to be to preserve the
“litigation efficiencies” of arbitration so that litigating parties can derive the benefits of
accessible adjudication. See, e.g., Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). See also Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995). See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 ; Scherk, 417
U.S. 506, reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265.
39

For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s arbitration opinions, see generally
CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 359-428.
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have no inclination or ability to fund new courts. 40 Arbitration is a workable remedy
that resolves disagreements effectively with little, if any, public oversight. It
addresses all aspects of a dispute: its emergence, definition, and resolution. Its
applicable range is complete.
By supporting arbitration unequivocally and shaping its regulation accordingly,
the Court has provided American citizens with access to a functional process of
adjudication. Were it not for arbitration, the benefits of U.S. citizenship would be
poorer. In effect, arbitration is the wellspring of political and jural legitimacy in
American law and politics. Its mandate is to uphold the right to redress grievances
by attenuating the intricate, nearly nonsensical complications of due process and the
“kick boxing” mannerisms of procedural jousting. In many respects, the failings of
judicial justice have been the stepping stones of arbitration’s success. 41
C. Adaptability and Growth
Two final observations underscore arbitration’s basic character. First, arbitration
is a resilient and adaptative process that seeks to maintain its functionality and
appeal. Indeed, as for successful species, adaptability is arbitration’s quintessential
trait. Relatedly, arbitration is compelled by a commercial heritage of pragmatism. 42
For example, as transborder arbitral litigation became increasingly adversarial and
complex, arbitral practice generated a form of arbitration with simplified procedures
and proceedings, namely, fast-track arbitration.43 Rather than cede business either to
courts or mediators, arbitration devised a means of responding effectively to market
demands. Expedition and economy—arbitration’s celebrated traditional virtues—
were available through the exercise of party choice.
40

See id. at 21-56.

41

Thomas Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
233, 266 (2008) (“Individual parties gained access to a viable form of adjudication that
provided workable remedies and basic fairness. Arbitral adjudication also had an extensive
track record of adaptability to new circumstances . . . [a]daptability, expertise, and eventual
finality are the principal characteristics of arbitration.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the
Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213, 258 (2005)
(“The functionality and adaptability of arbitration became attractive in all areas of civil
litigation.”); Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 259 (“[T]he development of arbitration has
demonstrated its creative ability to adjust and adapt to its changing mandate.”).
42

Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory
Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 231 (1990), reprinted in ON ARBITRATION, supra
note 8, at 351, 5 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 231 (1990) (“Arbitration has long provided a
pragmatic alternative to court proceedings—to the formality, delays, financial onus, and
generally destructive effects of full-blown litigation.”).
43
Fast-track arbitration, or “time limited” arbitration, are contractual provisions enhancing
the effectiveness and speed of arbitration by incorporating a deadline which the arbitrator
must follow in rendering the award. In fast-track cases, arbitrators are given substantial
authority. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 60; Hans Smit, Fast-Track
Arbitration, 2 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 138 (1991); Nicolas de Witt, Comment: Online
International Arbitration: Nine Issues Crucial to Its Success, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 441, 464
(2001); Mirèze Philippe, Are Specific Fast-Track Arbitration Rules Necessary?, ARBITRAL
WOMEN 253, http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/0105202718125.PDF.
See
generally CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, LARS KIRCHHOFF, & GABRIELE SCHERER, ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 86 (Kluwer Law International 2006).
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Unlike court litigation, arbitration has never been a zero-sum game. In maritime
arbitration, a long-standing form of commercial arbitration, for example, joinder and
the participation of non-signatory parties became a fixture of the process because of
the inter-related character of maritime transactions. 44 The transport of goods by sea
generally involved large sums of money and required the distribution of risks. 45 The
transactional pattern typically involved a shipowner, the renter of the vessel, the
buyer and seller of cargo, and a number of insurers in the background. The interests
of the parties were secured by primary and secondary underwriters. An arbitration
between any two parties affected the interests of the other participants to the
44

See Maritime Arbitration Rules, Doc. No. 1, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, § 2,
http://www.smany.org/sma/about6-1.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (Consolidation) (“The
parties agree to consolidate proceedings relating to contract disputes with other parties which
involve common questions of fact or law and/or arise in substantial part from the same
maritime transactions or series of related transactions, provided all contracts incorporate SMA
Rules.”); Id. § 17 (Attendance at Hearings) (“Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration
are entitled to attend hearings.”).
45

“The origins of maritime arbitration can be traced as far back as the voyages of ships
owned by ancient Phoenicians carrying the cargoes of Greek traders. Ever since, arbitration
has played a significant role in waterborne commerce. Although American Courts regularly
enforced arbitration awards from the early days of the Republic, it was not until 1925 that the
U.S. Federal Arbitration Act [9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14] (the “Act”) was enacted, establishing
guidelines and a summary means for enforcing arbitration agreements as well as awards. New
York has regularly been chosen as an arbitral site in charter parties and other contracts of
affreightment starting with the New York Produce Exchange Time Charter in 1913. Although
the New York Produce Exchange, founded in 1861, no longer exists, its form of charter party
remains in wide general use throughout the world. The charter calls for arbitration of disputes
in New York by three commercial men (which is understood to mean “three commercial
persons” regardless of gender). Many disputes are also arbitrated in New York under various
tanker and other charter parties.” Maritime Arbitration in New York, SOCIETY OF MARITIME
ARBITRATORS, INC., http://www.smany.org/sma/about2.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
Maritime Transactions are defined by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, as “charter parties, bills of
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
to vessels, collisions or other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of
controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction.” FAA, supra note 16, § 1.
Today, typical maritime disputes are based on specific factual controversies requiring expert
knowledge of maritime practices and technicalities of vessels, navigation operation, and
personnel requirements, such as: Standard contractual matters of sale, purchase, and repair of
vessels; Seaworthiness; Negligence and officers’ conduct; Storage of cargo; Loading and
unloading cargo; and damages. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 99102. Generally, such disputes require technical expertise rather than legal knowledge.
The Society of Maritime Arbitrators provides maritime parties with the following arbitration
clause: “Should any dispute arise out of this Charter, the Matter in dispute shall be referred to
three persons at New York, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, and the third by
the two so chosen; their decision or that of any two of them shall be final, and for the purpose
of enforcing any award, this agreement may be made a rule of the Court. This Charter shall be
governed by the Federal Maritime Law of the United States. The proceedings shall be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. The
arbitrators shall be members of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.” SMA Model
Arbitration Clause, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC., http://www.smany.org/sma/
smamodelarbitration clause.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). See also SOCIETY OF MARITIME
ARBITRATORS, INC., MARITIME ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 1-3 (3d ed. 1994).
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transaction, making consolidation a necessity. The use of three-member panels in
commercial arbitrations also attested to the molding of arbitral procedures to
emerging procedural exigencies and user needs. These tribunals provided each party
with a relatively “sympathetic” arbitrator who could emphasize the designating
party’s position during the arbitrators’ confidential deliberations. Each party’s
position would then be considered at this crucial stage of the process. Although
loyalty to the appointing party rarely dictated an arbitrator’s actual vote, the presence
of a neutral arbitrator eliminated any prospect of deadlock.
Additionally, when the merits review of awards became standard practice in
English arbitration law, arbitrators began issuing “cryptic” awards that were purged
of any reasoning on the law and merely summarized the facts and the parties’
arguments and announced the outcome of the litigation. 46 Today, the use of
“emergency arbitrators” prior to the organization of the official arbitral tribunal
preserves evidence and assets, thereby assuring the effectiveness of eventual
proceedings.47 Moreover, experts are often heard collegially by arbitral tribunals 48 to
avoid the superficial “tit-for-tat” of expert opinions and provide the tribunal with
information of practical value.
Second, arbitration continues not only to be adaptive, but, relatedly, to expand its
jurisdictional range. The development of employment and consumer arbitration is
one illustration. The use of arbitration in these transactional settings liberated the
mechanism from the confines of specialty and integrated it into the more visible
sectors of economic activity in society. Despite the distrust of political partisans,
arbitration has become a remedy for everyday disputes that involve ordinary people.
The use of arbitration reflected the quid pro quos in the parties’ relationship.
Expedited but fair justice suited the parties’ desire for efficiency and effective
outcomes. People wanted to have their say before a decision-maker who listened to
them; then they wanted a responsive and considered result that allowed them to

46

See ON ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 82-83; Thomas Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral
Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 581-86 (1996).
47

On “emergency arbitrators,” see generally Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The
ICDR’s Emergency Arbitrator Procedure in Action, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (Nov. 2008/Jan.
2009); Bjorn Tude, Arbitration-Sweden SCC’s New Rules on Emergency Arbitrators,
INTERNATIONALLAWOFFICE.COM (FEB. 11, 2011), www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters
/detail.aspx?g=e9; Therese Villard & Polina Permyakova, Revised SCC Arbitration Rules
Have Entered Into Force, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, (Feb. 4, 2010), www.arbitration.
practicallaw.com/0-501-3993; Jonathan Leach & Julian Berenholtz, The Expedited and
Emergency Arbitrator Procedures under the SIAC Rules—Six Months on, How Have They
Fared?, HOGAN LOVELLS (FEB. 2011), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/68f010f
5-af65-41ac-b36a-eecc77c4b805/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7b3ea0d5-04cd-4308-8
e15-fa15ae622148/Article_on_revisions_to_SIAC_Rules.pdf;
Freshfields
Bruckhaus
Deninger, Briefing Singapore International Arbitration Centre Issues Revised Arbitration
Rules, FRESH FIELDS (July 2010), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/july 10/2
8537. pdf.
48

See generally CAMPBELL MCLACHIAN, LAURENCE SHORE, MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2008); ANDREW
NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2009); TODD
WEILER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2005).
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resume their daily activities. In truth, arbitration accomplishes these ends far better
than judicial litigation.49
On the international side, investment arbitration is a forceful example of
arbitration’s virtuosity.50 Investment arbitration and the related use of the WTO
dispute settlement system51 indicate that arbitral adjudication has made an inroad
into curtailing the absolutism of sovereignty in transborder commercial activity. The
Schmittoff days,52 in which the State lacked the motivation even to notice arbitration,
have long been eclipsed. States are indeed interested in global investment practices
and participate actively in World Bank,53 NAFTA,54 and BITs-driven arbitration.55
In the final analysis, States are open to accepting the authority of arbitrators and
arbitration in exchange for a stake in the lucrative business of global commerce. 56
Arbitration’s role in resolving investment disputes accentuates its adaptability
and resilience.57 Early in the NAFTA arbitration process, the problem arose of the
49

See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3.

50
See generally CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC
CLIMATE (2d ed. 1981); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, SCHMITTHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1980).
51

See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, A HANDBOOK
ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2004); PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & FRANK
SCHORKOFF, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2006); ANDREW D. MITCHELL, WORLD TRADE
LAW ASSOC. CONF., CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR WTO (2005); RUFUS H. YERXA & S.
BRUCE WILSON, KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2005).
52

See, e.g., LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON, & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2010); CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, & AUGUST
REINISCH, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2009); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (2009).
53

See generally IVAR ALVIK, CONTRACTING WITH SOVEREIGNTY: STATE CONTRACTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010); David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy?
Political Process and International Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909 (2010); Mark C.
Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration,
73 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 335 (2010); Jan Paulsson, The Power of States to Make Meaningful
Promises to Foreigners, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLE. 341 (2010).
54

See, e.g., CHARLES H. BROWER II, JACK J. COE, JR., & WILLIAM S. DODGE, NAFTA
CHAPTER ELEVEN REPORTS (2006); KINNEAR, BJORKLAND, & HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT
DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER II (2006); TODD
WEILER, NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE,
FUTURE PROSPECTS (2004).
55

See, e.g., UN CONF. ON TRADE & COMMERCE, BITS IN THE MID-1990S (1998); UN CONF.
ON TRADE & COMMERCE, BITS 1995-2006 (2007); UN CONF. ON TRADE & COMMERCE,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES (2005).
56
See generally CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, NOAH D. RUBINS, DON WALLACE, & BORZU
SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (2008).
57

On the requirements for arbitrators and tribunals and their qualifications in the
investment context, see, e.g., The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (2004); IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, IBANET.ORG, http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_
free_materials.aspx#ethics (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement
Procedures under Chapters 19 & 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, WORLD
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impact of the arbitrators’ prior experience on tribunal determinations. 58 Some
arbitrators were commercial people, while others had a greater affinity for
diplomatic considerations. Arbitral administrators eventually developed rules by
which to achieve greater balance in the selected panels, so that the State was not at
the mercy of the disposition of commercial litigators. 59 Moreover, ICSID arbitrators
recognized the value of amicus curiae briefs in arbitrations involving natural
resources in Latin American countries. 60 Both developments reflected arbitration’s
ability to adjust its practices and procedures to new political elements. Allowing
commercial arbitrators to ignore the State’s public dimension or prohibit public
interest groups from participating in proceedings would have depreciated
arbitration’s appeal and suitability as a mechanism of dispute resolution. 61
TRADE LAW, www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/19-20code.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011); Rules of
Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, WTO.ORG (Dec. 11, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rc_e.htm.
See generally Charles B. Rosenberg, Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty
Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 505 (2010); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor:
Exploring Decision Patters of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010).
58

See generally WEILER, supra note 48. The controversy was ignited by an editorial in the
NY Times in 2004, entitled “The Secret Trade Courts.” The accusations were that
commercial litigators assembled as arbitral tribunals and resolved matters in such a fashion so
as to promote corporate interests—not the would-be public interests supported by the State.
The proceedings were private and confidential—closed to public attendance. The awards
were also inaccessible. Once the proceedings were opened to the public, the journalists lost
any interest in observing the process when they became aware of the complexity of the
matters under adjudication. The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A1.
59

See generally DUGAN, supra note 56. See also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v.
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1581_
En&caseId=C67.
60

See generally Andre de Lotbinière McDougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Tribunals Apply
New Rules on Amicus Curiae, 22 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 69 (Feb. 2007); Gary Born,
Steven P. Finizio, David W. Ogden, et al., Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID Amends
Investor-State Arbitration Rules (2006), available at www.wilmerhale.com/publications/
whPubsDetail.aspx?publication; ICSID Tribunal Affirms its Power to Admit Amicus Curiae
Participation, available at www.ciel.org/Tae/ICSID_AmicusCuriae_lJun05.html; ICSID
Tribunal accepts civil society organizations as amici curiae, available at www.ciel.org/Tae/IC
SID_AmicusCuriae _24Feb07.html.
61

See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but
Investors Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM, (June 25, 2009), www.law.com/jsp/law/interna
tional/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731&slreturn:/&hbxlogin=/ (“Argentine financial
crisis claims have been a major driver of investment treaty arbitration in recent years. During
the 1990s, companies like BP plc, Suez, TOTAL SA and Enron Corp. flocked to Argentina as
the government embarked on a major privatization spree. Then, in 2002, the Argentine
government took a series of emergency measures to avert an economic free fall, including
unyoking the peso from the U.S. dollar. When Buenos Aires refused to let foreign-owned
utilities hike the price of basic services like water, gas and electricity to compensate for the
peso’s sharp drop, many foreign owners cried foul. Starting in 2002, investors began to file a
slew of arbitration claims, alleging breach of investment protection treaties. In recent years,
Argentina has accounted for a quarter of ICSID’s case load. Several large law firms . . . have
handled more than a half-dozen Argentine claims apiece—often billing $5 - $10 million a
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It is undeniable that the operation of investment arbitration remains dependent
upon State fealty—or, at least, acquiescence—to treaty obligations and, further, the
national government’s willingness to enforce awards through local courts. 62 In the
end, the State must willingly surrender its authority to the transborder process.63
Even China’s integration into the global economy, however, required the Communist
case, according to cost filings—and seeking hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of
clients. Collectively, our 2009 Arbitration Scorecard counted more than 40 cases against
Argentina, while arbitrations involving Argentina have produced some of the largest arbitral
awards in recent years, including the $133.2 million CMS award and a $185 million award in
favor of U.K. energy company BG Group plc.
“To date, more than a half-dozen arbitration rulings have been handed down by tribunals in
Argentine crisis cases. Arbitrators have tended to agree that the emergency measures taken by
Argentina were in breach of treaty obligations, because they overturned prior contractual and
legal commitments made to investors. But to the dismay of many observers, arbitrators have
diverged sharply on the central question as to whether Argentina’s emergency measures—and
the resulting treaty breaches—can be excused by the economic calamity which befell the
country.
“In the first ICSID ruling on this issue, in the CMS case, arbitrators flatly rejected Argentina’s
arguments that it acted out of “necessity” in response to the crisis. The following year, a
separate ICSID tribunal took a contrary view: Argentina’s emergency measures may have
harmed the U.S. gas company LG&E Energy Corp., but they were excused on the grounds of
necessity, at least during the peak months of the financial crisis. In a black eye for ICSID,
separate arbitration panels hearing broadly similar claims under the same U.S.-Argentina
bilateral investment treaty had reached sharply divergent conclusions.
“Arbitration specialists try to put a positive spin on these developments, stressing that some
inconsistency is “unavoidable” given that there is no formal doctrine of precedent in
arbitration. However . . . lack of predictability in the ICSID system is making it increasingly
difficult to advise clients on their international treaty rights.
“Meanwhile, lawyers for the Argentine government complain that “contradictory” rulings give
conflicting signals to governments trying to regulate their economics while complying with
international law. Argentina’s attorney general Osvaldo Guglelmino says that the ICSID
system of one-off arbitration is “ill-conceived” when it comes to handling a tidal wave of
similar claims arising out of systemic crises.”).
62
See generally id. See also Guido Barbarosch & Pablo F. Richards, The Arbitration
Review
of
the
Americas
2011
Section
3:
Country
Chapters,
GLOBALARBITRATIONREVIEW.COM,
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/32/sections/
115chapterscountry (last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Eric David Kasenetz, Desperate Times Call for
Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight
in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 709 (2010); Hulya Dagdeviren, Political Economy
of Contractual Disputes in Private Water and Sanitation: Lessons from Argentina, 82
ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 25 (2011); Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain future
of ICSID in Latin America, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 409 (2010).
63

Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 398 (2009) (Believing the term “mandatory arbitration” is
a misnomer. When disagreements involve parties of disparate levels of sophistication and
arise from adhesive contracts, arbitration is ‘mandatory’ only in the sense that it is imposed by
the stronger party as a precondition to transacting with the weaker party. It is, therefore, both
more accurate and user-friendly to name this form of arbitration ‘adhesionary’ or ‘disparateparty’ arbitration.”).
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Party to acknowledge that international business could not take place without a
functional rule of law supplied by an independent, recognized, and effective system
of adjudication. Despite difficulties and imperfections, CIETAC Arbitration makes
business relationships and transactions with China viable. 64
Its ability to adapt and expand its range of application speak well of arbitration’s
commercial legacy and its adjudicatory future. Judicial litigation is analogous to a
black hole that devours social resources, while arbitral adjudication performs the
function of a white hole that returns energy and matter to society so it can continue
to exist and develop. The contemporary ascendancy of the arbitral remedy
demonstrates that adjudicatory systems can operate effectively without (or despite)
the exercise of State regulatory power. Even in its extreme form, court deference to
arbitration has not impoverished the legal system. The law of arbitration is
increasingly sophisticated; it has generated an abundance of legal rules and
standards. A corpus of provisions has emerged that provide for the process’
universal operation and enable it and the societies in which it functions to flourish.
Astute social systems understand the need for intelligent regulation. Externallydevised constraints, imposed for reasons other than systemic integrity and cohesion,
are not only artificial and inapposite, but they also undermine the targeted process’
viability. Unless instances of radical and irremediable injustice emerge, an ethic of
self-policing, the expansion of arbitrator power, and State quiescence remain the
proper modus vivendi for the legal regulation of arbitration.
II. EMERGING ISSUES
A. Adhesive Arbitration and Unconscionability
As the reach of arbitration expands to more sectors and activities, the reformation
of adjudication that it portends has encountered stronger headwinds and greater
opposition. Three critical issues have arisen. The first of these captured the interest
of the legislative branch of the federal government and some state legislatures. It
relates to the potential fundamental unfairness and alleged abuse associated with the
use of arbitration in imbalanced transactions in which the economically stronger
party obligates the weaker one to engage in arbitration—a practice that amounts to
coerced participation in the arbitral process.65 Commercial enterprises and

64

On CIETAC Arbitration, see generally YU Jianlong, CIETAC Arbitration in a Nutshell,
in BUSINESS DISPUTES IN CHINA CH. 8 (2d ed. 2009); JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE IN CHINA (2008); JOHN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA (2001); I. NEIL KAPLAN,
PETER MALANCZUK, DANIEL R. FUNG, et al., ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2001). See also M.
MOSER, PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CIETAC RULES OF ARBITRATION (2011).
65
See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Panacea]; Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996);
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory];
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1017, 1042 (1996); Heidi M.
Hellekson, Taking the “Alternative” out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: the
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employers often impose arbitration upon consumers and employees on an all-ornothing basis. The subordinate party’s ability to buy and sell goods and services and
to be employed depend upon its willingness to acquiesce to coerced arbitration.66
Economic isolation is rarely, if ever, desirable or sought-after. The motivation for
arbitration is, therefore, paternalistic or worse in these circumstances. It is, by any
measure, an “involuntary” choice—a type of “super” term and condition.
The economically superior party, however, not only makes the arbitration of
disputes the passport to economic activity in society, but also dictates the manner of
recourse to arbitration. The superior party’s extensive control over the “bargain” for
arbitration increases the prospect of overreaching and abuse. Critics emphasize that
adhesive arbitration agreements violate basic fairness and the traditional canons of
contract formation.67 In addition, stronger parties can use the reference to arbitration
Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising out of
Employment Contracts, 70 N. DAK. L. REV. 435 (1994).
66
See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 39 (Arguing that “the current regime of compelled
arbitration rests on three faulty analytical positions: the failure to distinguish submission
agreements from pre-dispute agreements (the false analogy with settlements); the presumption
that compelled arbitration is substantively outcome-neutral (the false analogy with forum
selection); and the insistence on reviewing consent-based challenges to compelled arbitration
on a case-by-case basis, rather than generically.”). Additionally, “displacing adjudication
through pre-dispute arbitration clauses systematically reduces the legal liability of corporate
defendants. This is particularly troubling where regulatory statutes are involved. The
enforcement of adhesive arbitration clauses allows firms to lessen the regulatory impact of
statutory claims—in short, to deregulate themselves.” Id. at 37. EEOC Policy Statement on
Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at E4 (July 11, 1997) (The EEOC
complains that mandatory arbitration “affords no opportunity to build a jurisprudence through
precedent” and the availability of judicial review is necessary to protect plaintiffs’ rights; that
costs may be prohibitive for employees as compared to employers; statutory rights may be
limited, thus reducing the amount of damages; the public plays no role in selecting the
arbitrators, while the private nature of arbitration limits the amount of public accountability;
and perceived procedural and structural biases against plaintiffs in arbitration as opposed to
litigation, especially in employment discrimination cases; Stone, supra note 65, at 1042
(Certain arbitration policies: (1) prevent government agencies like OSHA from enforcing their
laws; (2) reduce the statute of limitations; (3) alter the burden of proof; and (4) allow for
untrained arbitrators.). But see Sternlight, Panacea supra note 65, at 674-675 (“Four major
policy arguments can be articulated in defense of a preference for binding arbitration. First,
some might propound a genuine or free will freedom of contract argument, asserting that
where all parties have knowingly agreed to arbitrate the court should enforce that agreement.
Second, some contend that even if all parties have not knowingly agreed to binding
arbitration, they will nonetheless all benefit from the process because arbitration will save all
parties time and money. Third, some argue that even though sellers might want to use the
arbitration process to gain an advantage over consumers, the operation of the market will
prevent them from doing so, and that arbitration will again benefit all. Fourth, some might
contend that even if a few parties are harmed by binding arbitration, the gains for society as a
whole outweigh any such individual losses.”).
67

See, e.g., Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 65, at 669-70 (arguing that Gilmer’s
validation of binding and mandatory arbitration in the areas of employment and labor
disputes, denies employees’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The violation applied to
consumers and any other unsophisticated party involved in adhesionary contracting.). “The
Seventh Amendment jury trial right supercedes any policy emanating from a federal statute.”
Id. at 717. Hellekson, supra note 65, at 457 (“To be a true ‘alternative’ for both employees
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to exclude legal remedies and thereby reduce their exposure to liability.68 Further,
they can declare themselves exempt in some, many, or all circumstances from the
obligation to arbitrate.69 Arbitration, then, becomes a means by which the
advantaged party abridges the weaker party’s rights and enhances its own position. 70
As long as arbitration continues to benefit from judicial protection, the imposing
parties can escape accountability and restrictions on their conduct.
Depriving weaker parties of their rights through contract engendered demands
for corrective legislation. Proposed laws categorically banned the use of arbitral
clauses in adhesive transactions.71 The blanket condemnation amounted to a lethal
approach; it could stigmatize and create bias against arbitration. No matter how
illogical or inaccurate, such positions—once established—are difficult to contain or
alter. Their imprint can be long-lasting, perhaps indelible. Declaring arbitration
agreements absolutely unlawful, even in a single set of circumstances initially, is
drastic.72 It invites a return to the days of the legal system’s hostility to arbitration
and casts doubt upon, and an illicit aura around, all arbitral contracts, imperils
arbitration’s broad social use, and could deprive American citizens of arbitration’s
substantial procedural benefits. Seeking to criminalize adhesive arbitration 73
reflected the proverbial circumstances of “throwing the baby out with the bath
water.” Regulation should heed the wisdom of moderation. Full-out banishment
should be replaced by the goal of adding a new section to the FAA designed to

and employers, arbitration must be voluntarily entered into after the dispute has materialized.
This voluntary, dispute-oriented arbitration was what Congress endorsed when enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which encouraged courts to authorize parties to engage in ADR
techniques ‘where appropriate.’”). But see Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 252 n.118 (“Mere
access to the remedy makes it a substantial improvement over the judicial process.”).
68
These provisions are known as “carve outs.” They allow the drafting party to limit its
exposure to arbitration by exempting some disputes from the agreement’s range or coverage.
Such hold-back provisions render the clause suspect and must be justified by “business
necessity.” Donald Lee Rome & David M. S. Shaiken, Arbitration Carve-Out Clauses in
Commercial and Consumer Secured Loan Transactions, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 42 (Aug.-Oct.
2006). Court enforcement of non-compete clauses is a standard example of such provisions.
See generally Aames Funding Corp. Sharpe, No. Civ.A.04-4337, 2004 WL 2418284 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 28, 2004).
69
There are examples of abuse in this area, but it should be emphasized that the promise
of judicial justice often remains an abstraction. Arbitration provides a functional remedy. See
Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 247-49.
70

See Fairness in Arbitration Act discussed in Arbitracide, supra note 6, at 252 (“The
potential superiority of arbitration becomes manifest when the obligor pays the costs of
arbitration, is equally subject to the duty to submit disputes to arbitration, and includes all the
forms of relief available in court, including class action litigation, attorney’s fees, and punitive
damages.”). See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000);
Mercuro v. Sup. Ct., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. App. 2002); Flores v. Transamerica Home
First Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 2001).
71

See generally Arbitracide, supra note 6.

72

See id. at 275.

73

Id. at 262-63.
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regulate—sensibly and reasonably—adhesive arbitration.74 Once righted, even a
wobbly form of arbitration outdistances court litigation on the terrain of adjudicatory
worth and effectiveness.
Despite their thorough knowledge of the decisional law, the critics of adhesive
arbitration have neglected to take into account the content of actual rulings. 75 Courts
have eradicated much (possibly all) of the unfairness of adhesive arbitration by
requiring mutuality in the obligation to arbitrate, the allocation of arbitral costs
primarily to the stronger, imposing party, and mandating that arbitration proffer
relief closely equivalent to that supplied through judicial procedures. In this vein,
arbitral institutions have adjusted their arbitration rules to make aggregative
proceedings available.76 Advocacy on the basis of ideological fervor is akin to
acting on anger or rage. It is gratifying momentarily, but, in the end, it is an
irrational foundation for conduct that leads to outcomes that are costly to repair.
Intemperate behavior rarely benefits the greater good. Anger and ideology generally
misconceive reality and distort the significance of the implicated interests and the
positions associated with them. Irrational thinking and behavior should be avoided
in all circumstances.
B. Litigation About Arbitration
The other emergent issues in arbitration law do not implicate the convictions of
political ideology. They raise more genuine issues of legal analysis. In point of
fact, the second of the three issues was identified by the U.S. Supreme Court itself.
In a number of landmark opinions, 77 the Court maintained that the profusion of
judicial litigation about arbitration was antithetical to the purpose and effectiveness
of arbitral adjudication.78 The raison d’être of arbitration is precisely to avoid
judicial recourse.79 Accordingly, court actions that challenge the reference to, or
results of, arbitration are counterproductive. This consequence explains, at least in
part, the unequivocal character of the Court’s rulings on arbitration. Creating
exceptions to the practice of favoring arbitration not only generates more litigation,
but also leads to the possibility that these exceptions will engulf the original rule and
eventually absorb it.
Even pro forma opposition to arbitration can be harmful. Empty challenges, too,
could help convert the FAA into a latter-day Administrative Procedure Act (APA).80
74

Id. at 275.

75

See works cited supra note 65 (beginning with Sternlight, Mandatory).

76

See Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, http://adr.org/sp.asp?id
=22440 (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (AAA class procedures).
77

First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444.

78

Id.

79

See CARBONNEAU, LAW
supra note 10, at 263 n.6.

AND

PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 387-88. See also CASEBOOK,

80
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500. See SENATOR PAT MCCARRAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG., 1944-46, 298 (Pat
McCarran ed., 1997) (According to Sen. McCarran, the APA was “a bill of rights for the
hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated” by federal
government agencies.).

2011]

FREEDOM AND GOVERNANCE

79

The APA was one of the first experiments in U.S. law with ADR; in the wake of
WWII, it was intended to simplify litigation brought against proliferating
government agencies through the use of judges specialized in administrative law,
flexible trial models, and a body of accommodative legal principles. 81
Administrative law litigation, however, became a highly complex, expensive, and
protracted form of court litigation.82 The Court, therefore, is right to warn of the
danger of pushing arbitration toward the re-invention of the wheel mold that
inevitably returns to the status quo ante.83 American society needs to have a genuine
opportunity to avoid the crushing burden of judicial litigation and its crippling
impact on socio-economic processes.84
C. Power Roles
The final issue, also linked to standard legal analysis, relates to the distribution of
power within the arbitral process. To some degree, the principal parties in an
arbitration—the arbitrating parties through their agreement, the designated
arbitrators, and the institutional administrators—vie for controlling authority in the
conduct of hearings and reaching a determination. 85 The State—through the vehicle
of legislation, the courts, or both—is also a major participant in the power
configuration within the arbitral process. Acting in the name of the public interest,
the State―by exercising its regulatory capacity―can facilitate arbitral operations by
giving them autonomy or discourage them by imposing restrictions upon the
accessibility and finality of arbitration.86 The objective of government oversight
should be to prevent fraud and overreaching, rather than fostering ill-conceived
social policies that hamper initiative and creativity. 87 The targeted entity or activity
81
See D. HALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 2009);
George Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947).
82
This concern points to the need to make “decisions with teeth” if any real change is to
be effectuated. The process of judicial litigation provides an adjudicatory framework that is
too cumbersome and expensive to maintain in the sector of civil litigation. If arbitration
becomes excessively judicialized, it will cease to be an alternative. Adjudication is necessary
to social civilization, but it cannot exceed social resources.
83

Responsive alternatives are a new element in the social contract. Adjudication must be
fair and effective. Arbitration is a proper solution even in adhesive circumstances.
84
See generally, Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002).
85
The entire modern law of arbitration aims precisely to foster legislation that favors
arbitration and its autonomous operation, beginning with the enactment of the FAA in 1925
and proceeding through the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model law, and various
national laws on arbitration (in France, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and other
jurisdictions). The tenor of the law determines the fate of arbitration and the availability of
functional civil justice in society. See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 3.
86

See FAA, supra note 16, § 2 (arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable”).
87
See generally Urban Informal Sector Investment Climate Analysis in Kenya, Note
Number 35, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Aug. 2006), http://siteresources.world
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must have sufficient latitude to flourish and thrive. The provision of basic
safeguards and the containment of “animal spirits” are important goals,88 but
freedom and self-definition are vital to the development of people and social
institutions alike.
Most arbitral statutes give the agreement to arbitrate conclusive effect. If the
contracting parties have provided for a particular requirement or procedure, their
intent, as long as it is at least remotely lawful, prevails. The settled view recognizes
that the contracting parties have the legal right to choose to arbitrate and, further,
provide for the specific character of their arbitration.89 Freedom of contract and party
autonomy are generally dispositive. In some regulatory frameworks on arbitration,
the failure to implement the agreement as written can result in the nullification or
non-enforcement of an award.90 When the contract is silent on a given issue,
arbitrators possess the authority to fill the gap. 91 The parties agreed to arbitrate and
they are entitled to the benefit of their bargain―namely, arbitrator resolution of
contested or unprovided-for matters.92

bank.org/INTAFRSUMAFTPS/Resources/aftpsnote35E0610-17.pdf (“. . . the application of
measured regulation that beneﬁts the public good.”).
88

See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
161-162 (1936); GEORGE A. AKERLOT & ROBERT J. SCHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009).
89
See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479 (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as
they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may
they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”).
90
See the grounds of the non-enforcement of awards under the New York Convention,
supra note 10, art. V(1)(d) (“That the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitration
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. . . .”).
91
The rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in the final analysis, grant
tribunals the authority to choose the rules governing the proceedings. Rules of Arbitration,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2010), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploaded
Files/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf. Article 15(1) states that “The proceedings
before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules and, where these Rules are
silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on,
whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be
applied to the arbitration.” Id. art. 15(1). The language of the arbitration is governed by
Article 16, which states that “In the absence of an agreement by the parties, the Arbitral
Tribunal shall determine the language or languages of the arbitration, due regard being given
to all relevant circumstances, including the language of the contract.” Id. art. 16. The
applicable rules of law are governed according to Article 17(1), which states that “The parties
shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits
of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the
rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.” Id. art. 17(1).
92

See generally Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. K&i Construction,
Inc., 270 F.3d 1060, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001) (“courts . . . would sometimes be required to deny
employers the benefit to arbitrate by requiring arbitration but permitting unions to continue
striking.”).
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Institutional administrators generally respect the procedural and decisional
powers of the arbitrators.93 They see their function as, and are compensated, to
organize the arbitration and address non-adjudicatory administrative problems.94
The arbitral tribunal conducts the hearings and decides the merits.95 Arbitral
institutions have the discretion to refuse to administer arbitrations governed by
flawed contract provisions (e.g., that require the administrator to apply the
arbitration rules of another arbitral institution);96 they can demand that all arbitrators
or arbitrations fulfill certain requirements (e.g., for arbitrators, relating to
impartiality, nationality, experience, and professional qualifications; for arbitrations,
relating to time limits, basic hearing protocols, rules for discovery or the use of
experts, and the like).97 It is unusual for the administrator to refuse to seat a
designated arbitrator or to challenge arbitrators. A highly controlling approach could
undermine the institution’s competitive standing in the service sector. Generally,
institutional administration takes place pursuant to broad-gauged rules, a deferential
attitude toward the parties and the arbitrators, and a view that the purpose of
administration is to make arbitrations workable and effective.98 Although conflicts
can arise, there is a type of collaborative consensus that characterizes the relationship
between the arbitrating parties, the arbitrators, and the arbitral administrator
throughout an arbitration.
Power relationships and investitures, however, shift throughout the arbitral
process. The crown of supreme sovereignty is worn by different participants at
different stages of the adjudication. The exercise of authority is, in effect, a doubleedged sword. Although it empowers, it also contains the seeds of its own extinction.
The freedom to choose is curtailed and eventually eliminated by its very exercise.
The nearly unfettered privilege of contract choice, for example, is ensnared once it is
invoked, enforced, and made binding. At the very outset of the transaction—before
any disagreement emerges—the parties decide all matters,99 subject to the restraints
of public policy and their ability to agree (whether to arbitrate, how to select the
arbitrators, the choice of ad hoc or institutional arbitration, the designation of an
arbitral institution [if relevant] and of governing laws, and, possibly, the details of
the arbitral procedure). When a dispute divides the parties and the arbitration
agreement is invoked, the arbitrators designated, and the tribunal constituted, the
93

See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 390-1. See also institutional
rules at Rules of Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2010),
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf; ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, WORLD BANK, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp; Arbitration
Rules (2000 Edition), CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, http://www.ciarb.org/infor
mation-and-resources/2010/06/14/CIArb%20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf; Maritime Arbitration
Rules, SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, http://www.smany.org/sma/about6-1.html.
94

See generally CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3.

95

Id. at 77.

96

Id. at 77-86.

97

Id. at 48-50.

98

Id. at 48.

99

Id. at 49.
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right to decide flows from the parties to the arbitrators, 100 just as the earlier
designation of an arbitral administrator exemplified, and concomitantly signaled, the
abridgement of the parties’ absolute authority. The constitution of an arbitral
tribunal invests the arbitrators with the capacity to begin the trial of the matter and
progress to the resolution of the dispute. 101 At this stage, the arbitrators’ authority
can only be restrained by the arbitrating parties’ right and ability to settle, 102 unless
the arbitral contract contains uncommon stipulations.
Once the proceedings commence, the parties’ power is further constricted and the
arbitrators’ authority grows and becomes nearly absolute. At this point, the
arbitrators exercise sovereign authority over the arbitration. The arbitral tribunal
decides both procedural and substantive matters, 103 ranging from the choice and
implementation of trial mechanisms to the interpretation of the main contract (and,
perhaps, the arbitral clause),104 ending with the construction and application of the
law or other governing substantive predicates. 105 In this setting, the arbitral
administrator’s function is ministerial. 106 The contract generally invests the
arbitrators with comprehensive adjudicatory powers. The arbitration agreement is
the law of the arbitration, as long as it satisfies the basic conditions of contract
validity and the State acquiesces to arbitration and the exercise of contract power by
the parties.107 As noted earlier,108 the State policy on arbitration will be expressed
through legislation and in accompanying court opinions.
The State policy on arbitration has an impact upon the exercise of party choice
and the conduct of arbitrations. Most contemporary arbitration statutes (like the
FAA) command that courts facilitate and assist arbitral proceedings. 109 Once an
award is rendered and coercive enforcement becomes necessary, the State emerges
as the final arbiter in the process. 110 At this juncture, disgruntled or aggrieved parties
can avail themselves of the governing legislation and demand that awards and the
process that generated them comply with all the elements of the governing legal
rules. Aggressive judicial policing of arbitrator determinations and arbitral
proceedings indicates that State regulations disfavor arbitration and discourage
recourse to the remedy. But for a few jurisdictions, courts generally engage in a
hospitable and narrow evaluation of arbitrations and their determinations. 111
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Moreover, parties are expected to raise objections in a timely manner; the failure to
act promptly will constitute a waiver of their complaints. Even evident substantive
or factual misunderstandings by arbitrators are deemed innocuous and
inactionable.112 Moreover, arbitrators have substantial discretion in the conduct of
arbitral proceedings.113 In order to undermine the validity of an award, procedural
errors must constitute fundamental prejudice to a party’s basic rights. 114 The most
likely actionable flaw is an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a known or ‘knowable’
conflict of interest.115 As long as State policy favors arbitration, courts engage in
circumscribed, subdued, and unassertive assessments of the operation of the arbitral
process.
III. STATIST AND MEDITATIVE ARBITRATION
Power relationships—who holds decisional authority, how much of it, and
when—have generated a “new” debate in U.S. arbitration law. The asserted
positions highlight the clash between party autonomy and State regulation and revisit
the legitimacy of arbitration founded upon contract—so-called consensual
arbitration. The critical questions center upon the extent, if any, of the State’s
preemptive role in regulating arbitration and, relatedly, whether freedom of contract
always reigns supreme in the reference to and operation of arbitral adjudication. 116
The written exchanges have propounded a stark choice between a statist and marketdriven concept of arbitration—an issue that has actually long preoccupied the
thinking about arbitration.
The Russian model of arbitration best exemplifies the statist perspective on
arbitration.117 According to Russian concepts, arbitrators, their adjudicatory powers,
112

See, e.g., Wallace v. Bultar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d. Cir. 2004); Agrawal v. Agrawal, 775 F.
Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 969 F.2d 1041 (2d. Cir. 1992).
113

See, e.g., Berlacher v. Painewebber Inc., 759 F. Supp. 21 (1991); Robbins v. Day, 954
F. 2d 679 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992); Hayne, Miller & Farni, Inc. v. Flume,
888 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
114

See FAA, supra note 16, § 10(a)(3) (“Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.”).
115

See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968); Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. NYC Dist. Counc. Carpen. Ben. Fds., 748 F.2d 79 (2d. Cir.
1984); Ovitz v. Schulman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 830 (Ct. App. 2005).
116

See Christopher Drahozal, Privating Ordering and International Commercial
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031 (2009); Christopher Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization
and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise between Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy
Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public Law, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1227 (2009).
117
On Russian Federation arbitration, see William Butler, State Interests and Arbitration:
The Russian Model, 113 PENN ST. L. REV 1189 (2009) (Prof. Butler’s article was part of a
symposium, entitled, “Building the Civilization of Arbitration,” sponsored by the Penn State
Law Review. The articles were subsequently published as a book by Wildy, Simmonds &
Hill Publishers (London) in 2010. The volume bears the title of the symposium, BUILDING
THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, edited by myself and Angelica Sinopole, a lawyer at
Sullivan and Cromwell (NYC), who served as an Editor-in-Chief of the Penn State law review
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and the very principle of contract freedom are secondary to the State regulation of
arbitration.118 A number of U.S. academic commentators align themselves with the
statist view of arbitration. Their position centers upon the neologistic phrase—
“private ordering” process—to describe arbitration and its operation.119 The phrase,
in effect, has founded an academic trend that argues that arbitrators cannot, by their
conduct of proceedings or decisions, thwart or defy a State’s public interest policies
and practices.120 They must comply with the jurisdictional seat’s mandatory legal
provisions. But for its contemporary political substratum, the position barely differs
from F.A. Mann’s stance in the debate with Berthold Goldman about the existence
and legitimacy of “anational” arbitration.121 Otherwise stated, the State may have
ceded a large portion of the ministerial function of civil adjudication to arbitration,
but private adjudication remains a mechanism within a uniquely political activity at
the core of the State’s public responsibilities.122 Delegation by the State does not
imply the surrender of State authority to private interests and parties.
The private ordering camp endorses the enhanced judicial policing of arbitral
awards and agreements—their nullification when they allegedly intrude upon the
preemptory functions or jurisdiction of the State. While authority in arbitration may
be “shared,” the advocates posit, the State has ultimate authority―a veto power.
The parties in arbitration cannot be absolved of their responsibility to obey
fundamental legal norms, assuming that these norms can be identified and
established on the basis of solid legal principles. Because they adjudicate
controversies, arbitrators are the implicit agents of the State. The State is not, and
cannot be, indifferent to the resolution of disputes and the application of law, no
matter where or how they take place.
during the symposium.) See also DAVID GOLDBERG, GORDON BLANKE, & JULIA ZAGONEK,
ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, Russian Federation
(2006).
118

See generally Butler, supra note 117.
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An online dictionary provides two definitions of “neologism”: 1. “a new word, usage,
or expression,” and 2. “a meaningless word coined by a psychotic.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neologism. The notion
of “private-ordering” straddles the fence between the two definitions. It testifies to the
limitations of academic coinage. It is neither particularly useful nor enlightening. It seems
simply to describe a well-established concept with a new term. The expression has elements
of originality, but the idea it encapsulates is entirely recycled. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Private Ordering, 97 NW. L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2002); Oliver E. Williamson, The Law of
Contract: Private Ordering, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 438 (2002); Michael Birnhack, Principle of
Private Ordering, HAFIA CENTER OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, www.isoc.org.il/hasdara
/private_ordering doc (“Private Ordering is the process of setting up of social norms by
parties involved in the regulated activity . . . and not by the state.”).
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See sources cited supra note 116.

121

On F.A. Mann and Berthold Goldman, see THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ed., LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT (rev. ed. 1998).
122
The Court’s opinions permitted arbitration to function with greater autonomy while
minimizing the role of judicial supervision and reducing the volume of litigation pertaining to
arbitration. See First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. at 943 (“A court must defer to an
arbitrator's arbitrability decision when the parties submitted that matter to arbitration.”);
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
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This concept of arbitration stands in contradistinction to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisional doctrine. Its proponents fail to heed the Court’s warning about
the consequences of excessive judicial litigation about arbitration.123 They trust the
State, despite its changing power structure and inability to resist short-term political
advantage, to establish legal rules that promote the general good. This concept of
arbitration ignores the testimony from the history of arbitration itself—in particular,
from maritime and CBA arbitration—that extols the virtues of self-regulation.124
The very development of American arbitration law makes evident that State
regulation of arbitration need not be expanded beyond deferential judicial
supervision.
The market and party-driven view of arbitration is a more robust and convincing
concept of the distribution of authority within the arbitral process. It is not based
upon imported values or convictions, alien to both arbitration and adjudication. It
emerged from actual experience with the process. In this configuration, the parties
exercise a stronger influence on the arbitration by choosing a trial format in their
agreement125 and by participating in an assessment of the award before it is finalized
by the arbitrator.126 While the party choice of an arbitral trial at the head of the
123

See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3.

124

See Lawrence Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictability of Procedures,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1323 (2009).
125

See Hans Smit, Contractual Modifications of the Arbitral Process, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
995 (2009).
126
See Jeanmarie Papelian, Collaborative Divorce: Toward a Conflict-Free Divorce, 7
ABA FAM. LAW LIT. 1, 9 (2008) (Collaborative law consists of a “paradigm shift” under which
parties engage in cooperative strategies to resolve disputes. It applies primarily in the family
law area, situations in which the parties are likely to need an on-going relationship. The
approach eliminates the threat of adversarial litigation and encourages parties to focus on
logical problem-solving and their respective self-interest. The process is based on four
principles: “(1) proactive participation; (2) interest-based understanding; (3) cooperative
resolution; and (4) team effort.”). See also John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About
Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007);
Michael Moffitt, Symposium: Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later: Three Things to
be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1226 n. 86 (2009) (“This
system incentivizes parties and attorneys to work together. While judges must follow specific
rules and guidelines, parties using the collaborative process can create customized solutions
and control the pace of the process.”); Rebecca A. Koford, Conflicted Collaborating: The
Ethics of Limited Representation in Collaborative Law, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827 (2008);
John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law:
Ethics ad Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1315
(2003).

There is some evidence that a consultative procedure has been practiced in the judicial setting.
In Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, the court acknowledged
that it had circulated “draft judgments” “to counsel, solicitors and the parties on a confidential
basis in accordance with well understood practices.” Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWHC (Civ) 158, [¶ 4], Q.B. (Eng.), available at
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/158.html. These practices allowed “the opportunity
for correction” even by the judge because none of the terms of a draft judgment were binding.
Id.
The court further explained:

86

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:59

process probably reflects a judicious use of contract freedom, the submission of a
draft award to the parties is problematic. Both changes may be market-savvy, but
collaboration between the arbitrator and the parties as to the final award muddles the
role of the arbitrator and redefines the adjudicatory character of arbitration. The
final determination is envisaged as a type of collaborative exercise, but the extent of
collaboration, a vital concern to the legitimacy of the procedure, is unclear.
There are serious misgivings associated with decisional collaboration. First, it
ironically highlights the benefits of the statist heavy-handed regulation of arbitration.
Statism’s emphasis on the public interest restricts contract freedom and arbitrator
discretion and lessens the prospect of collaboration and, concomitantly, the danger of
collusion and self-interested conduct. Second, when a sharing of decisional
authority takes place between the arbitrator and the parties, it is difficult to determine
which actor, if any, is the true adjudicator and whether genuine adjudication has
taken place. The process appears to have elements of both arbitration and mediation
or negotiation.127 Third, it is difficult to justify collaborative arbitration as a form of
closing arguments. It represents a collegial decision between the arbitrator and the
parties. It creates a possibly ambiguous relationship, especially in terms of the
arbitrator’s reappointment in subsequent litigation. Finally, it may be a form of
arbitration that is useful only in limited circumstances, e.g., involving an arbitration
with a single arbitrator or parties who are seeking to repair a transaction and
continue their commercial partnership. It is always hazardous to blur essential
boundaries between different processes and merge them eclectically. Anarchy is not
creativity if the exercise of license does not generate clarity or lucidity.
Be that as it may, greater party presence and power in the decisional phases of
arbitration may announce (I strongly suspect) the future progression of the arbitral
process. It repairs the rift of authority between the arbitrator and the parties.
Nothing in the current law prevents contracting parties from choosing a collaborative
form of arbitration, in which the designated arbitrator performs the role of an
“evaluative mediator” who guides the parties to an agreement on what the arbitrator
(or they) believe(s) to be their best solution. To some degree, the arbitrator sets the
table, but the parties, if they agree, can decide where to sit. The arbitrator is seeking
party acquiescence or accommodation before the hammer of decision falls. Such
“meditative arbitrations” can emphasize settlement and are but a dim reflection of a
standard adjudication. Unless the proper personalities and dispositions are in place,
the incorporation of a consultative stage to the arbitral process is likely to be
confusing and perhaps ritualistic. While party agreement should prevail, when it is
absent, someone must make the final decision. Collaboration between the arbitrator
The primary purpose of this practice is to enable any typographical or similar errors in
the judgments to be notified to the court. The circulation of the draft judgment in this
way is not intended to provide an opportunity to any party (and in particular the
unsuccessful party) to reopen or reargue the case, or to repeat submissions made at the
hearing, or to deploy fresh ones. However on rare occasions, and in exceptional
circumstances, the court may properly be invited to reconsider part of the terms of its
draft.
Id. [¶ 5].
127
See MEGAN E. TELFORD, MED-ARB: A VIABLE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVE
(2000); Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International Commercial Dispute
Resolution, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 411 (2011).
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and the parties could only be effective when the arbitration has fully informed the
parties, who―guided by the arbitrator’s resolution―can reach the settlement that
eluded them at the outset. In the end, it is a procedure that may underestimate the
depth of human disagreement.
In order to preserve the adjudicatory integrity of arbitration, consultations
between the arbitrator and the arbitrating parties could be limited to achieving
specific objectives that are intended to perfect the award and immunize it to, or
perhaps remove it from, judicial challenge. Review by the parties should purge the
determination of factual imprecisions, flagrantly erroneous reasoning, or
incomprehensible conclusions. Consultations at the final stage of the process would
be, in essence, an extensive editing exercise. The building of consensus between the
parties as to the award should be a consequence, not the objective, of the procedure.
The losing party may find it difficult to confine its evaluation to the written quality
of the award. In the present state of the law, any challenges on the merits,
amounting to an internal appeal to the deciding arbitrator, should only allow the
arbitrator to respond to party objections in a fashion that does not truly alter the
initial determination. Consultations would be a means of rectifying evident errors or
misunderstandings and to state fundamental opposition to the arbitrator’s
conclusions. It is one thing to ask the arbitrator to respond to objections; it is quite
another matter to have the arbitrator take them into account in revisiting the
determination. The other party would, at the very least, participate in the
proceeding. It would have the consequence of making the arbitral process more
judicial and adversarial at the critical stage of decision. Crossing the line into
consultations and collaborative endings could be a perilous development that alters
the adjudicatory gravamen of the arbitral remedy.
IV. THE SPECTRE OF MORE AGGRESSIVE JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
Recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings indicate a possible reversal of the Court’s
favorable attitude toward arbitration in the form of a more pervasive and persistent
form of judicial supervision. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds, Inc.128 and Rent-ACenter v. Jackson129
were disturbing rulings that portended a substantial
reorientation of the doctrinal direction on arbitration law. It seemed that arbitration’s
status as the Court’s golden child was being reconsidered. The cases were decided
by a conservative majority; it was, therefore, entirely plausible that the Court wanted
to reassert the traditional role of the judiciary in the resolution of civil litigation.
Stolt-Nielsen was by far the more radical case.130 It involved the maritime
transportation of goods.131 The cargo owner believed that the transporter had
engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy with other shippers that affected suppliers of
the commodity.132 The allegation was made during an arbitration between the
transporter and the cargo owner.133 The possibility of conducting class action
128

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758.

129

Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772.

130

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758.
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See id. at 1764-65.

132

Id. at 1765.

133

Id.
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proceedings was raised and specifically submitted in a written submission to the
sitting arbitrators.134 The arbitral clause made no mention of the availability of class
proceedings.135 The arbitrators accepted the submission, held hearings, and listened
to experts.136 They rendered an award stating the parties’ original agreement did not
prohibit class proceedings.137
The Court vehemently disagreed with the arbitrators’ conclusion, permitting the
parties, in effect, to engage in class proceedings under the rubric of their arbitral
clause.138 It founded its objection on two factors: (1) the silence of the agreement;
and (2) the enormous procedural difference between bilateral arbitration and class
litigation.139 The majority stated and reiterated that the silence of the arbitral clause
was deafening.140 The arbitrators could not simply invent content and ascribe it to
the contract.141 Silence was silence; it did not point in any direction. 142 Arbitrators
could not rewrite the parties’ contract. 143 The parties had not agreed to class
proceedings.144 The Court emphasized that at least one maritime expert maintained
that class litigation was wholly incongruous in maritime transactions, if only because
its transborder character would generate paralyzing conflicts of law and, perhaps,
jurisdiction.145
The majority then contended that its reversal of the arbitrators’ determination
was further justified by the enormous procedural differences between ordinary
arbitration and class litigation. 146 Class litigation is antagonistic to arbitration and its
adjudication goals.147 It conflicts with and undermines arbitration’s informality,
confidentiality, expedition, and use of expertise. Interpreting the arbitral clause, in
effect, to tolerate class procedures adds a material element to the parties’ agreement
that completely alters it, creating a contract not agreed-to by the contracting
parties.148 In effect, the majority opinion misrepresented the narrow character of
arbitrators’ award and engaged in the judicial second-guessing of expert arbitrators
in a highly commercial and traditional form of arbitration.
134

Id.

135

Id. at 1766.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

See generally id.

139

Id. at 1765.

140

Id. at 1765-66.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 1766.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 1769 n.6.

146

Id. at 1775-76.

147

Id. at 1776.

148

Id.

2011]

FREEDOM AND GOVERNANCE

89

The Court’s ruling in Stolt-Nielsen was its first direct statement about class
litigation in arbitration. It was an advance over the plurality decision in Bazzle,149 in
which the Court essentially ignored the class litigation issue. There, to address the
question of the silence of the arbitral contract, it attributed greater interpretative
authority to the arbitrator to construe the arbitral clause. 150 In Bazzle, the Court
greatly enhanced the arbitrator’s decisional authority at the head of the process,
allowing the arbitrator, in effect, to resolve the issues of contract inarbitrability
without a party-conferred delegation of jurisdictional authority. 151 When the
majority concluded that the Stolt-Nielsen arbitrators engaged in an “excess of
authority,” it contradicted the core plurality ruling in Bazzle and violated the prime
admonition of contemporary arbitration law by engaging in a merits review of the
award. In effect, the Court aggrandized judicial supervision, voided the holding in
Bazzle, and displayed an unsympathetic attitude toward arbitration and its systemic
needs. Stolt-Nielsen, along with Volt Information Sciences, Inc.,152 are the only two
modern arbitration cases in which other policies trumped the usually hospitable
judicial support for arbitration. In Volt, it seems to have been motivated by the need
to dispense lessons in contract drafting and, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court’s unfavorable
assessment of class action and its impact upon economic and commercial activity.
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson (RAC) follows Stolt-Nielsen.153 Although the majority
reasoning there is much less dismissive of arbitration and its interests, the Court
again endorses a policy of greater judicial supervision of the arbitral process. 154 The
circumstances are a variation on the fraud-in-the-inducement problem in Prima
Paint.155 In RAC, the issue pertained specifically to a delegation of jurisdictional
authority under the contract pursuant to First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.156
Jackson alleged that the arbitral clause unilaterally imposed by the employer was
unconscionable because, inter alia, of the fee-splitting arrangement and the
limitations on discovery.157 These deficiencies, it was asserted, voided the entire
clause because abuse and unfairness permeated the agreement. 158
As in Prima Paint, the plaintiff failed to direct its objection to the jurisdictional
delegation in particular.159 The delegation, therefore, remained in effect and gave the
arbitrator the power to decide the unconscionability claims raised by the
employee.160 The immediate application of the reasoning in RAC clearly supported
149
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154

See generally Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772.

155

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395.

156

First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938.

157

Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2789.

158

Id.

159

Id. at 2780.

160

Id. at 2780-81.

90

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:59

arbitration and arbitrability, but—once it was decided—all future plaintiffs would
avoid the error of Jackson’s strategy and challenge directly the validity of the
jurisdictional delegation. Under the holding in RAC, the court would then need to
intervene and rule on the contractual propriety of the delegation provision. There
was no indication that review would be the hospitable supervision that ordinarily
applies to enforcement matters in arbitration. A possibly strong judicial presence at
the head of the arbitral process was virtually guaranteed, attributing greater power to
the courts over arbitration. Such a precedent hardly adds to the autonomy,
independence, and functionality of arbitration.
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, a subsequent case, reaffirmed the Court’s
traditional and long-standing support of arbitration.161 It held that a line of California
state court rulings that often led to holding arbitration clauses with class action
waivers unconscionable conflicted with the fundamental objectives of FAA § 2 and
was preempted by federal law.162 The decision essentially validated class waivers as
a lawful part of the bargain for arbitration. It also gave implied legitimacy to
adhesive consumer contracts. In so ruling, the Court repeated the Stolt-Nielsen
distinction between bilateral arbitration and class proceedings, confirming the
Court’s distaste for aggregation litigation. Nonetheless, the prospect of de novo
review of arbitral awards and the availability of judicial supervision even when the
parties have entered into a jurisdictional delegation provision challenge more
substantially than ever the independent and unobstructed operation of the arbitral
process.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the course of the American judicial doctrine on arbitration may have
been unsettled by recent decisions, 163 judicial rulings are likely to remain favorable
to arbitration. The fragility of settled principles, however, could be lessened by the
incorporation of greater analytical rigor in the Court’s reasoning. The Court’s
decisional law is built on common law modalities. It now seems to contain two
separability doctrines and provide for contractual and decisional versions of
kompetenz-kompetenz. The haphazard quality of the analysis has reinforced the
criticism of arbitration in adhesive circumstances. The Court should explain why an
imposed legal obligation to arbitrate is nonetheless legally valid, much like it
explained—over time and a number of cases—why federal law preempts state laws
that conflict with its interpretation of the FAA. Cogent analysis always pays
substantial long-term dividends.
Obviously, the Court marches to the beat of its own drum. Its responsibilities are
substantial. Its rulings have a mighty impact upon society. Nonetheless,
opportunistic reasoning makes arbitration vulnerable to legislative attacks and the
assaults of advocacy. Circumstantial doctrinal inventions lack coherence and can
become inconsistent; cryptic, implausible explanations create derision and
confusion. In a word, despite its many accomplishments, the judicial doctrine on
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arbitration is wanting in substantive rigor, weakening the force of the vision that
animates it.
Throughout the decisional law on arbitration, the strained and makeshift
character of majority opinions is almost always accompanied by high quality
dissenting opinions. This feature of the law may indicate the difficulty of achieving
a majority consensus within the Court and, concomitantly, the imperative need to
forge a consensus on arbitration because of its importance to civil litigation. As
Justice Ginsberg has pointed out, arriving at a five-member majority can have a
decisive impact upon the content of an opinion, making it into a more eclectic and
scattered statement of law. Articulating an individual position in opposition is easier
to express in a cohesive declaration. The difference between Justice Souter’s
majority opinion in Hall Street Associates and dissent in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett is a
telling illustration.164
The irony that results from the interplay of historical factors and institutional
exigencies is that one of the most hospitable jurisdictions to arbitration does not have
a cogent statement of law on arbitration. The FAA is antiquated and was molded as
special interest legislation. It is not a law of arbitration in any real sense of that term,
and political partisanship makes a new, more elaborate version virtually impossible.
The RUAA, literally, is a disaster. The Reporter’s Notes are, by far, a better
statutory statement than the provisions themselves. The uniform law is poorly
written and organized. Moreover, it has now been superseded by subsequent
developments.
Finally, the development of collaborative arbitration coalesces with the desultory
analytical quality of arbitration opinions to create a true danger to the continued
viability of the mechanism. While arbitrations must remain independent of the
courts, arbitrators do not necessarily need to be autonomous in relation to the
arbitrating parties. The clandestine power struggle between these principal actors
arises in part because parties pay the arbitrators and the latter exercise authority
pursuant to a contract, not a public jurisdictional mandate. Arbitral practice may no
longer be able to justify the court-like subordination of the parties to the arbitrator.
Arbitration may be transformed into a form of “participatory adjudication” in which
results are reached only after extensive consultations between the arbitrating parties
and the arbitrator. The institution of such a system would be a radical departure
from settled practices and currently controlling views. It may so alter arbitration that
the latter becomes ineffective in the resolution of disputes. Despite the lucidity of
the Court’s vision on arbitration, there is an equally clear need for limpid definition
of essential notions. The Court should provide the necessary guidance to protect the
integrity of arbitral adjudication and prevent it from becoming a tool by which
arbitrators placate parties and sustain their own business interests.
Public judicial adjudication is characterized by two attributes. First, the
application of public jurisdiction complicates the dispute resolution process with
unyielding rights protections and procedural requirements. Solutions are bloated and
reached inefficiently; proceedings are protracted and prone to both legitimate and
illegitimate delay; the process devours time and money. Received political values
dominate the mechanism, which is more formal, complex, and difficult to
implement. The procedural ritual often far exceeds, and even distorts, the parties’
disputes. Second, unless there is outright corruption, judges—certainly federal
164
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judges who are appointed for life—come as close as possible to a state of absolute
disinterestedness. They have no personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding; if
they do, they are obligated to recuse themselves. They are the impersonal agents of
the State, would-be public servants, whose oath requires fidelity to the U.S.
Constitution and the integrity of law. Other than the subliminal influence of
personal opinions, judges must behave in a neutral manner: They apply legal
precedents, guarantee that due process governs, and survey the parties’ combat for
procedural rectitude. The impartial character of the process is further guaranteed by
the availability of appeal to yet other judges.
When an arbitrator begins collaborating with the arbitrating parties to reach a
final resolution, the adjudicatory character and integrity of the arbitral process are
diminished. Commercial parties, at least those who disfavor arbitration, have long
complained about the “dictatorship of the arbitrator.” In fact, some commercial
parties have further maintained that they should return to the process of judicial
litigation because it better enables them to negotiate and exercise control over their
own destiny. Enhancing party prerogatives to all stages of the arbitration may make
the process less subject to criticism by its users, but—to some degree—collaboration
transforms arbitral adjudication into structured negotiations or a form of
arb/med/arb, in which the arbitrator finalizes the dispute (adjudication) only after the
parties have reviewed and approved the arbitrator’s conclusions (settlement). The
award constitutes a form of homologation or a ruling based upon agreed terms.
This adjustment of arbitration is initially controversial, but it may ultimately be
inconsequential. It gives greater, more forceful expression to the principle of party
autonomy. It may be essential to the continued viability of commercial arbitration.
It reflects the type of osmosis that, historically, prevailed in the creation and
development of traditional forms of arbitration. It alters fundamentally, however,
the protocol of arbitration, transforms the raison d’être of the process by giving it a
hybrid character, and creates a form of complicity that would be intolerable in the
public process of adjudication. Although it may be a brief for democratic
governance or the rule of the marketplace, it foils the aloofness of the arbitrator and
the neutrality of the process. Survival through adaptability may be arbitration’s most
vital attribute, but it is beginning to exact a substantial price. Are the proponents of
the various transformations and modifications being entrapped by their own ideas?
Are we losing sight of the overriding public policy exigency of adjudication by
focusing so ardently upon the need for the arbitral remedy’s pragmatic adaptability?
These concerns restate the original dilemma of establishing a proper boundary
between autonomous self-regulation and the essential interests of society in
maintaining both its jurisdictional authority over adjudication and its level of
civilization.
Government regulation may be distasteful and destructive, but it is well-known
and its consequences predictable. It is rarely a feliticious event and even less
frequently produces real benefits for society or the sectors it afflicts. In comparison,
ingenious commercial creativity, although based upon an intimate sense of the
specialty area, is more disturbing than the prospect of bureaucratic regulation. It
gives rise to sui generis insights that portend real change, the results of which will
only be known once they have been tested by time and the marketplace. Some
moments of inspiration can be of enormous value, while others are merely flares that
never reach the level of useful or significant change. The propriety of the
contemplated change and the future of arbitration remain murky and elusive. A bad
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choice as to what is acceptable practice could result in substantial damage to the
arbitral process as well as the protection of rights.

